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Four Concepts of Virtuality to Reconstruct the Civic in Architecture

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Abstract

Architecture theory has suffered four losses that limit its relation to the civic: a drift away from critical theory ideas used in other fields; a transition from a "society of prohibition" to a "society of (forced) enjoyment"; the inability to form and use an idea of the unconscious, the psyche; and a turn generally to the image-and-caption style of thinking. My suggestion is to recover this lost ground by understanding virtuality in the fullest sense — not just as the addition of "hidden sides" and animated fly-throughs, but of the complex range of virtuality that has been the basis of the arts, magic, and philosophy from the beginnings of culture. Beyond the first form of virtuality, the uncanny plays a central role. Vidler's account (*The Architectural Uncanny*, 1992) should be re-worked to reveal the systematic features of the uncanny that work in perception, construction, and comprehension of architecture — features that reveal architecture's heart to be in "the performative," the essence of its relations to the civic.

The Four Losses

The case for restoring the civic to architecture must be made within the context of four "losses" that constitute the sites for four necessary "returns" that must take place simultaneously. This is not to add to the already-difficult task of restoring the civic but, rather, to show that the issue of the civic in architecture and cultural life as a whole is structurally bound up with transformations that have affected every level and aspect of life — esthetic, practical, and imaginary. We no longer see architecture the way we did 100 or even 50 years ago. We no longer *act* or *think* the way we did ten years ago.

(1) The first evident loss is the continual drift of critical theory in architecture away from the main concepts and actions of critical theory as a whole. The point at which theory allowed itself to be cut away from its moorings is easy to identify. It is the appearance of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987), a truly inspiring work but one that gave those without philosophical or critical theory background the confidence for renouncing further study, justifying the poeticization or renunciation of discourse; or the reduction of discourse to captions beneath photographs. Bristling with such metaphorically intense ideas as "rhizome," or "smooth" and "striated" spaces, *A Thousand Plateaus* was, in effect, a book that, in the minds of many readers, seemed to obviate reading most other books.

And, for a while, this book-burning opened up architectural teaching and thinking to new potentialities.[i] It was perhaps only when Eyal Weizman observed that the Israeli military had found that the Deleuzian theory was extremely useful in its operations of moving within the tight confines of Palestinian neighborhoods, as they converted civic space into ruins, "smoothing out" the "striated spaces" using Deleuze and Guattari's specific vocabulary, that it was clear that most applications of this theory were ideological rather than critical. The authors should not be blamed. Their book was not written to advise generals or even teachers in need of dogma. But, in the hands of those who have sought autonomy within a field that continually fears its old age, this book more than any other seems to allow and even promote the conclusion that architecture educators should at this point dispense with arguing about theory, in as much as arguments would require far too many other books to be read.

(2) The second loss is that of the civic itself. I have found no better biographer of this tragedy than Todd McGowan, who has characterized the past few decades in terms of the transition from a "society of prohibition" where the network of symbolic relationships (families, communities, cultures, etc.) limits every subject's access to enjoyment in terms of required sacrifices and honored laws and obligations.[ii] This is a cost-plus society, where anything is possible because everything is, in theory, prohibited.

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But, today, with the increasing emphasis on the autonomy of the individual — where selfishness and greed have in fact been promoted as virtues rather than vices — the society of prohibition has given way to a society of enjoyment. The catch is that enjoyment has been appropriated by multi-national corporations, who have universalized enjoyment in ways that optimize the marketing of gadgets and services that promise access to pleasure. Ironically and intentionally, the command to "Enjoy!" is not accompanied by any explanation of what it is that is to be enjoyed or instructions on how to enjoy. In the "Coke is it!" logic of modern marketing, the subject needs only to appear to be enjoying, even though he/she is not enjoying. The enjoyment is in the hands of the commercial promoters who have shifted public discourse to questions of free choice, personal fulfillment, and autonomy — all of which are negated because the symbolic relationships that would have given these some value have been compromised. Because capitalism is deeply invested in the ambiguity of the command of the Other to "Enjoy!" there is scant hope that the consumer economy will ever return to being a society of prohibition.

(3) The third loss has been the idea of the unconscious, reviled and scorned by modern (mostly American and Canadian) social science theory, which, in its turn to ego-psychology, has demonized Freud and Lacan. In the pursuit of pragmatism, progressivism, and the goal of personal happiness, academia left the unconscious where Fredric Jameson articulated it,

as a necessarily political (and hence collective) phenomenon.[iii] As Jameson became more and more Lacanian, his borrowed metaphor of the mental map gave way to a sophisticated idea of a collective unconscious — one that others could connect to such un-Jamesonian things such as anamorphosis, anamnesis, and *poiesis*. Jameson did all he could to restore the promise of materialism without exiling the idea of transcendence. Scholars had shifted interest from the Saussurian signified to more cognitive-behavioral accounts to get rid of transcendence (meaning "Hegelian dialectic") almost entirely. For transcendence to return from exile, the idea of the unconscious has to be revived in terms of a materialism that is not purely Marxist but, rather, Lacanian — based in the everyday transactions of popular culture. In other words, the feeding frenzy of the society of enjoyment has to be taken into account to explain why the subject is more and more attracted to do what is clearly not in his/her best interest; and why the rage for individualism is what nails shut the coffin of late-capitalist corporate hegemony.

(4) The notion of the unconscious is critical to the return to popular culture *via* a critique of its ideological and political implications, its built-in blindness. It is clear to me that only some version of Lacanian theory can tackle this, but I add a condition. Lacan seems to have unknowingly and interestingly duplicated Giambattista Vico's 18c. ideas, summed up by his famous motto, *verum ipsum factum*, that "we may comprehend (only) the things we

have ourselves made."[iv] This turns Aristotle's *adæquatia*, the correspondence model of truth, into the idea that the true is to be found *primarily* in the "fictions" (Lacan: fantasies) required to sustain cultural production. Without a return of architecture to a materialist basis in popular culture, the relation of this art to the unconscious, collective or otherwise, is impossible. Culture and language reveal themselves *precisely* in the ways they institute blindness. Blindness has many forms, including paradox, recursion, and boundary conditions. This requires a synesthetic and polythetic approach to this blindness, not any single mode of theorizing.[v]

Up to now, architectural interest in politics has been diverted into various advocacy campaigns that have used the language of the civic only to reach conclusions formed in advance. Ironically, we may read late capitalism in the terms of Hardt and Negri but still fail to conceptualize a specifically architectural or civic theoretic.[vi] In fact, such readings are often accompanied by a perverse non-logic: technology continues to deliver an architecture of consumption to the front lines, and capital converts former civic spaces into wastelands. Add, on top of this, the bonus of green technology to soften the blow. Apologists of parametrics extol biogenetic forms while projects convert natural landscapes into deserts reduced to a touristic mentality of consumption. The issue goes beyond the devastating effects of form-generating software on the architectural imagination. It includes the ideological conversion of the architecture

that sustained the old societies of prohibition. (The necessary intermediate step, of course, was "architectural preservation," which allowed the institution to be squeezed out by the bank or boutique but kept the façade.) The shift from prohibition to enjoyment is particularly evident among terms that were formerly qualified only within a network of symbolic relations, such as "individualism," "creativity," and "commitment." Such ideas have been re-wired. At first they are the means of enjoyment but, later, they become as very commodities that are proclaimed to materialize architectural value. It is no accident that the *net-work*, the idealized rationale of the rhizomous "research studio," is later promoted at the level of building solution as the mechanized high-tech screen able to handle any problem of orientation, as accomplished by Jean Nouvel's *Institut du Monde Arab*. Perversely, this particular skin, prepared to face in any direction, adopted the decorative motifs of a culture where such designs were used precisely to point the faithful in a constant direction. The "anywhere" once afforded to the faithful around the world in exchange for accurate and consistent orientation to the singular holy city became the "nowhere" and "anywhere" of universal design. Light and shadow are nullified by the technological skin in the same way drawing scale on the computer display is nullified by the mouse wheel.

Naturally, the trap is set for reactionaries to respond piece-meal to each new outrage. Complaining critics inadvertently credit trends towards a society of enjoyment with a mental coherence

they do not actually have. And, presuming defeat, they too often neglect to repair and refresh their own critical base. Just how hard is it to refute scholarship that comes in three pages of captions beneath photos of student work? Even in the face of Patrik Schumacher's near-infinity of prose, shouldn't some more effective counter-critique be mounted? Theory is not a set of advance directives to practitioners who will "prove" ideas through lucrative building contracts. Theory is based in writing; it corrects itself through exposure to risky situations, unaccustomed vocabulary, and the dangers of dialectic. Theory does not shun the psyche or treat the subject as a pleasure-seeking missile. It protects the pedagogy of the studio and the dialectics of the critique.

Virtues: Three Forgotten Virtualities

My recommendation would be to see the four losses that architecture theory has endured as structurally related. To return debate to the broad groundwork of critical theory may call for more serious reading, not just in philosophy but also in literary theory and political science. The trend from the society of prohibition to the society of enjoyment requires us to understand our material culture and political history. Developing this new consciousness will require an appreciation of the old *un*conscious, and here it is necessary to follow Lacan's project of clearing away the clichés about Freud, piled on mostly by American psychologists and psychoanalysts who realized that Freud's "no cure" pessimism wouldn't sell in the ego-centric consumerist culture of the late 20th century.[vii]

The unconscious, Lacan tells us in his Möbius band idea of *extimité*, is already collective; and in reviving it we will find what Freud found: a basis for cultural formation that relies neither on Jungian archetypes of wholeness or brain physics but, rather, language as the primary generator of the "non-linguistic" components of the Real. With this more complex view of the signifier, the events and objects of popular culture can nudge theory's angle of view from objects to subjects — or, more accurately, from objects that have been overly commodified by analogies and algorithms to a new alternative: the subjectified object, always correlative to the frame that sets it apart as object, a frame that includes an inside with an outside.

The means of recovering the lost civilization of prohibition is not impossible to find. The current mania for directly connecting the architect's most whimsical thought to a machine that will shape the building material itself employs only one surprisingly literal model of virtual space. This is the virtual of adjacency, the hidden side. This virtuality is valorized as the objective target technology must overcome. Space is reduced to something one can fly through and over, or zoom into. Space becomes directly correlative to only those views that can be manipulated on a screen. More than Descartres could have dreamed, space has become "just a medium," just a container of algorithmically generated form.

Architectural representation, *chez* Maya and Rhino, has forgotten about three other types of virtuality — virtualities that have been woven historically into music, literature, ritual, dress, and other practices, at least in cultures with less proximity to the Enlightenment. These virtualities barely receive mention in the trendy media studies programs that have sprung up in recent years. But, they have fueled culture for thousands of years by providing the links connecting imagination, collective memory, and materiality.

(1) After the virtuality of adjacency, which is happily conquered as soon as we turn the object around to reveal its hidden sides, there is a second type of virtuality: the "virtual of the attached." This is the virtuality of what is normally contiguous but which, in imagination, can somehow break loose. This is not just a case of an unfaithful friend, but some shadow that escapes its object. The original attachment has to be organic or causal. We use this virtuality through metaphors that dilute the original contagious magic that was its home base: the eye, hand, or ear turned into icons of visuality, form, or music. (Cezanne: "Monet is only an eye — but, God, what an eye!") It would be impossible to read fictional literature without unconsciously endowing characters with free choice, without allowing them to escape the fate imposed on them by the author. Who would bother to watch a movie or read a novel just to see characters march towards a preordained fate? However attachment is originally formed — no matter how tight the contract — this form of virtuality keeps open the possibility of escape and discovery and retains the logic of contagious magic, allowing organs to operate without their bodies and objects to retain the aura of previous affections, as in the case of Magritte's rebellious reflection. Advertising knows very well just how effectively organs operate without bodies; they design their campaigns to allow the eye to see things that the brain does not acknowledge, the hand to run over a texture that only it will remember and later want to duplicate.[viii]

(2) The third type of virtuality is the inverse of attached virtuality: this is the virtuality of what is normally detached — the contamination of reality by the dream, the return to life of the dead, the contamination of the present by the ominous future or ghostly past. Detached virtuality is defined by unexpected appearances: the prisoner, locked up years ago, who shows up at the dinner table; the twins separated at birth who reunite; the dream promoted to reality by *déjà vu*. This form of virtuality comes with its own peculiar geometry, fused with morality. The forbidden appearance typically functions as an inside frame that turns space inside out. Where the virtuality of attachment is about an escape, the virtuality of detachment is about invasion of interior space by the exile. Edgar Allan Poe's short story, "The Masque of the Red Death" (1841), involves both. The nobility retreat to a walled estate in the country to escape the plague destroying the city, but the plague finds its way in, in the guise of a masked stranger who interrupts their revels.

(3) The second and third types of virtuality, attached and detached, involve ancient magic as well as modern narrative and visual motifs. The fourth type, "anomalous virtuality," pushes the theme of detachment to its extreme. What appears in our midst is not anything we once knew, sought to wake up from, imprison, or escape. It is an absolute Other, a force that is by definition "impossible" to see or conceive normally. The appearance of the anomalous borrows from each of the previous two forms of virtuality. From the logic of detachment, the appearance of the anomalous Other creates the same inside frame, a concentric set of spaces radiating outward from the point of entry, a "gate of God." Such is evident in Giotto's depiction of the Angel of the Apocalypse, whose horn suggests this kind of logic in both acoustics and shape; the Angel rolls up the human scene, time and space included, as if it had been nothing more than a tapestry, to be tied up and stored in some dusty corner of Eternity.

The virtuality of anomaly also borrows from the logic of attachment, in its creation of a flattened screen breached by a scandalous portal, a Borgesian Aleph. With anomaly the shadow not only escapes its owner — it confronts the owner and challenges it for priority. As in Magritte's painting of the man whose mirrored reflection refused to look at him, the escape would have been bad enough; the return is the cause of disaster. The result is a breakdown or collapse of dimensionality itself, not just a temporary short-circuit of *déjà vu*. Anomalous virtuality eliminates temporality as such: what Dante experienced through the reflection of eternity's concentric rings in Beatrice's eyes. Anomalous virtuality moves from the single negations of attached and detached virtuality to double negation, in which identity itself undergoes obliteration.

What does this have to do with architecture or architecture criticism? If we trace back through popular culture, we will see that the human imagination has favored the virtualities of detachment, attachment, and anomaly far more than the simplistic virtuality of adjacency. They are, after all, the basis of the uncanny. The eye motorized by the computer fly-through, after all, sees only what it would have seen by other means of transportation. The truly portable eye, the eye as a Lacanian partial object, an organ without a body, is the eye developed in antiquity, by shamans who gave initiates the chance to fly as birds or swim as fish. Such experiences were not imagined as fictions; they were experienced as actualities and provided insights going far beyond what we have timidly approached as "man-environment relations." These second, third, and fourth kinds of virtual motion are not just physical variants that we can simulate on a computer screen; they embody what we might describe as "other forms of knowledge." They replace the presuppositions that statically frame thought and doom it to paradox with a truly active and collective idea of the performative.

The performative and the additional virtualities it requires allow us to re-

shape the psychoanalytical idea of the unconscious and the Renaissance idea of the civic into contemporary and politically responsive conceptions of collective memory and imagination. The civic and the unconscious are combined by the idea of the performative, but an appreciation of the performative (by joining *praxis* to *theoria*) requires re-entry into the arena of critical theory discourse. I'm thinking here, of course, of Lacan's principle advocate in the past two decades, Slavoj Žižek, but also three of Žižek's colleagues, Mladen Dolar, Alenka Zupančič, and Eric Santner.[ix]

The political theorist Eric Santor suggests an entirely new basis for looking at the unconscious of architecture. Dolar and Zupančič focus on the dimensionalities of the human senses. Their resistance to offering specific political advice cultivates restraint by showing just how virtuality is fundamentally performative — and, hence, both "collectively unconscious" and political — and just how political potentiality depends on the collectivity that is afforded by the virtual.

The first time we glance at the expanded list of virtuality types, we can realize the symmetry that ties them together. Detached and attached virtualities are about things that belong together that fall apart and things that don't belong together that meet up. The effect in either case is the uncanny, and we can borrow from the early essay by Ernst Jentsch to relate these two cases to his two primary "polarities" of the uncanny.[x] The living person with a kernel of fate that leads

to an appointment with death, A_D, is the complement of the dead person or thing that resists death, D_A. A_D has a special relationship to adjacencies however. It is in the readily available choices that are contingent to the present that 'A' discovers that, no matter how much freedom of choice there appears to be, he/she is drawn closer to the final end *precisely on account of that freedom*. This is an employment of coincidence, Aristotle's *tuchē* (from the *Physics*) as a kind of uncanny causality. D_A in contrast is an automaton that continues to operate even after the plug is pulled, even when the organ is outside its body, even when it has already died a first time. This is possibly the most famous category of the uncanny, since it defines the period of ritual morning after the first death, when the soul must wander before reaching a second, symbolic death.

Mladen Dolar has written perceptively on the matter of the uncanny in Lacan's work.[xi] Unlike Vidler, who sees the uncanny, as do many other scholars, as a historic reaction to the oppressiveness of rationality intensified by the French Revolution, Dolar notes that the uncanny is a perennial component of ritual, magic, and folk-belief that barely skipped a beat during the French Revolution, except perhaps to spin off a few more Gothic novels. One of our theoretical projects must involve returning the uncanny from the suburbs of rationality to the public square. The Lacanian uncanny itself is already geared to address issues of the virtual. Its central principle is "the extimate" (*extimité*), the inside-out paradoxes of

human subjectivity. These involve themes of spatial and temporal structure, and passage across boundaries that change when we cross them.

1. Transitive and intransitive

Transitivity is the illogical use of boundaries to reverse cause and effect configurations, as when the young boy hits another and says "he hit me!" This escape from responsibility uses adjacent spatial zones to twist around the roles of cause and effect. The intransitive is the warping or curving of space that results from some performative intervention. A trip back home never seems to take the same amount of time as the trip out. Time folds space in ways that does not allow it to fit back into the box. This is the permanent difference between the map and the journal.

2. Retroaction and over-determination

In Pavel Florensky's *Iconostasis*, the paradox of dream time is analyzed as an initial event that generates its "prior events" retroactively, constructing them in a temporal frame where the ending must have actually been the first event.[xii] The structure required to manage these multiple reversals is chiasmus, a convergence of subjective and objective time, a kind of reverse-tree where contingent choices (the "branches"), instead of leading outward, direct action back to a single trunk. Instead of one cause leading to multiple effect, one effect in this case has multiple causes. Florensky argues that this logic is not unique to dreams, but extends to the broader spiritual space of the religious icon, the icon screen, and the experience of the spiritual journey itself. Clearly, the life-and-death negotiations of the Jentschian uncanny are relevant to Florensky's expansion of dream logic. Where *tuchē* shows us how folds are made in space and time, how automaton expands the functionality of the anomalous portal (the Borgesian Aleph) so that this simple limit to mastery (privation) is also the site of moral limits or warnings (prohibition). The architectural consequences of this exchange of privation for prohibition are well known: the Thesian labyrinth, model of the cleansing journey home required to decontaminate the soldier drenched in death; the cosmic road-map showing what the planets do when we can't see them; the diagrams accompanying the interval between the two deaths when the soul is presented with riddles, tasks, and labors.

The labyrinth, an architectural plan of a universal de-contamination buffer zone, gives away another secret: that it is the place of a different kind of memory — anamnesis. It is easy to bracket off Plato's theory of knowledge as memory by limiting it to the tales of souls circulating between stages of reincarnation, Beware! There's more in anamnesis than plots for New Age novels! We must remember the social function of the buffer: to maintain the integrity of the network of symbolic relationships — the civic as such. All cultures seem to be aware that the dead must be flowered and fed so that they will stay put at the boundary line that *locates* their tombs.

Many ridiculous things have been claimed on behalf of labyrinths. We have only to look soberly at a few features to discover their secret. Labyrinths are recursive; the Thesian labyrinth is one sequence (ABA) whose components contain the same sequence: $A_{aba}B_{aba}A_{aba}$. This fractal design argues for the portability of any part or collection of parts: they will always be a whole in terms of labyrinth logic. The other part of the secret is the status of the labyrinth as the ultimate automaton-*tuchē* combination. Its passages are pure adjacency, but the effect is to transfer the intellectual agency from the traveler to the travelled.

The labyrinth's meander "does the thinking for the labyrinth traveler," by removing the choice of turns. In a meander there are no cross-roads, no decisions whether to go left or right. This reduces the option of the traveler to a single issue — forward or back? The expanding and contracting turns make it difficult to keep this accounting straight, and once confidence on this matter is broken, it cannot be recovered. The labyrinth becomes an automaton, it thinks for you, fears for you, panics on your behalf. As its folded space suggests, it is pure Lacanian extimacy.

3. The "crystal decoder ring"

Gazing into the crystal ball of this diagram relating the forms of virtuality to *tuchē*, automaton, and the uncanny allows us to move quickly between issues separated traditionally into several independent levels. We should not forget: *the debates about how virtual space is to be automated are the most salient in architecture pedagogy.* This discussion of the virtual is thus not about obscure or esoteric issues. The "take-over" of theoretical positions by arguments grounded in digital representation and fabrication has gone past the frameworks that normally situate architecture experience within drawing and other representational traditions. Now, it is often claimed that new media eclipse all others and have set the agenda for theory — *if in fact theory is any longer needed*.


Diagram of the relation between *tuchē*, automaton, and the forms of virtuality, activated by the forms of the (Jentschian) uncanny.

It is clear from this diagram, however, that digital representation addresses only one-quarter of the field of the virtual, and that part only partially. Parametrics has no means of speaking to conditions outside the limited cases of adjacency, where "Cartesian" rules still dominate. The other three types of virtuality focus on how Cartesian rules are broken, where it is necessary to draw from the extensive resources of the uncanny in history,

ethnography, literature, magic, and the other arts. The uncanny, in effect, creates a bridge for architecture criticism's ability to take up its proper place within cultural constructs: Vico's *verum ipsum factum*.

The uncanny's principal categories, A_D and D_A, constitute an express lane for high-speed commuting to other points where cultural forms have been taken over by neuroses and anxieties, as in the case of foundation rituals and magic used by all cultures to protect buildings and their inhabitants.[xiii] These seemingly remote topics come back quickly and efficiently to the logical centers of architectural concerns. The correlation of the uncanny's polar categories to virtuality allows critical theory the freedom to compare representational practices with cultural, ethnological, and psychological considerations of the central issue of subjectivity.

Finally, the horizon established by the Aristotelian categories of "accidental" causality, *tuchē* and automaton, demarcates the *terra incognita* we must explore with the Lacanian idea of extimacy. Chance is not simple randomness or unpredictability — about which there can be little to say. We must be inspired by the courage of the Surrealists and *avant gard* artists who, from Poe to Roussel to John Cage, discovered that the role of chance was not only within the range of theoretical critique but the bull's eye of all of its targets. *Tuchē*, the affordance and opportunity occurring within the *iminent*, about-to-happen experience of the subject, necessarily constructs the

immanent (intrinsic always-already) Other, by which subjective desire is triangulated and demand (symbolic expressions of need, attraction, avoidance, etc.) is articulated. There is no representational surface or screen that is *not* wired to circulate these energies, no medium *exempt from* its economies and limits. Without the Lacanian idea of the extimate and the relation of the extimate to the varied forms of the performative, critical theory can make little progress.

The conclusion of this essay amounts to reflecting on the diagram that describes the uncanny's relation to the four types of virtuality. The Florenskian chiasmus of the dream, icon, face, and spiritual transformation; the labyrinth as a buffer between death and life; and the idea that civic space is *the* architectural unconscious are some results of this reflection. Where Lacan's idea of extimacy expands these through its logics of transitivity, retroaction, and over-determination, theory must address the extimate both in terms of its whole effects and its component parts. It must, in effect, refuse the "flattening effects" imposed by limiting architecture to the just one type of the virtual.

The return to the extimate and the uncanny is not just the daunting task of including "other ways of knowing." It is a recognition of the implicitly civic nature of architecture in terms of extimacy, directly inscribed into spaces, buildings, and details. For example, the above key diagram could readily map nearly every foundation ritual, from Romulus and Remus on. Twins,

fratricide, the plowed circuit, the altar's *ædicula* and the corpse in the cornerstone … the parts should not be taken out of the performative context that gives them roundness and meaning. You may catch the diagram at another angle and see that civic rituals themselves work to restore this roundness; that such cases as *Festarkitectur* or the tragic architectures of ruins and war so effectively condense this logic that they might serve as a kind of quick-study handbook, an "Architecture for Idiots". We already have too many of those, however.

Endnotes

[i] By no means do I wish to throw out Deleuze and Guattari in the process of criticizing the effect of *A Thousand Plateaus* or any other work on architecture theory. I recommend Simone Brott's pro-Deleuzian approach in *Architecture for a Free Subjectivity: Deleuze and Guattari at the Horizon of the Real* (Farnham, Surry, UK: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2011).

[ii] Todd McGowan, *The End of Dissatisfaction? Jacques Lacan and the Emerging Society of Enjoyment* (Albany, NY: SUNY, 2004).

[iii] Fredric *Jameson*, *Signatures of the Visible* (New York: Routledge, 1990).

[iv] Giambattista Vico, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1948). Note: Vico compares *verum*

and *factum* more directly in his book, *On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians* …, trans. Lucia Palmer (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), Chapter 1. See also, Donald Kunze, "Vichianism after Vico," *The International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, ed. Rob Kitchin and Nigel Thrift (London: Elsevier, 2009).

[v] Donald Kunze, "Who's on First?" *The Humanities in Architecture*, ed. Nicholas Temple, Renée Tobe, Jane Lomholt, Soumyen Bandyopadhyay (London and New York: Routledge, 2010).

[vi] Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).

[vii] Jacques Lacan, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. Bruce Fink in collaboration with Héloïse Fink and Russell Grigg (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2006).

[viii] André Nusselder, *Interface Fantasy: A Lacanian Cyborg Ontology* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009).

[ix] For a sample, see Slavoj Žižek, *Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991); Mladen Dolar, *A Voice and Nothing More* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006); Alenka Zupančič, *The Odd One In: On Comedy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008); Eric L. Santner, *On Creaturely Life: Rilke, Bejamin, Sebald* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

[x] Ernst Jentsch, "Zur Psychologie des

Unheimlichen," *Psychiatrisch–Neurologische Wochenschrift* 8, 22 (August 26, 1906): 195–98 and 8, 23 (September 1, 1906): 203–05.

[xi] Mladen Dolar, A Voice and Nothing More (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006). Dolar, Mladen, "'I Shall Be with You on Your Wedding-Night': Lacan and the Uncanny," *October* 58, *Rendering the Real* (Autumn, 1991): 5–23.

[xii] Pavel Florensky, *Iconostasis*, trans. Donald Sheehan and Olga Andrejev (Crestwood, NJ: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1996).

[xiii] Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, *The Ancient City, A Study on the Religion, Laws, and Institutions of Greece and Rome* (Kitchener, Ontario: Batoche Books, 2001).